This paper presents the findings of a study designed to determine the national benefits of freshwater pollution control. By using data from a national contingent valuation survey, we estimate the aggregate benefits of meeting the goals of the Clean Water Act. A valuation function is estimated which depicts willingness to pay as a function of water quality, income, and other variables. Several validation checks and tests for specific biases are performed, and the benefit estimates are corrected for missing and invalid responses. The two major policy implications from our work are that the benefits and costs of water pollution control efforts are roughly equal and that many of the new policy actions necessary to ensure that all water bodies reach at least a swimmable quality level will not have positive net benefits.
INTRODUCTION
In 1972 Congress passed the Clean Water Act (PL 92-500) by an overwhelming margin and thereby declared a national goal of zero discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985, an interim goal of achieving waters fit for fishing and swimming by 1983, and the requirement that water pollution sources meet nationally uniform pollution control technology standards established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). During the debate over this Act, Congress paid little attention to the cost of achieving these ambitious goals because the benefits seemed large and the costs were largely unknown and spread through time [Leone and Jackson, 198 
!]. It was anticipated that Congress could
The contingent valuation method uses survey research techniques to elicit people's preferences in the form of willingness-to-pay (WTP) monetary amounts. In its standard form, the CV survey describes a detailed hypothetical market in which a specified good may be purchased and asks respondents how much of their current household income in dollars they would be willing to give up in exchange for a specified increase in the level of the public good. Thus we ask the respondent for a direct evaluation of his househo!d's compensating surplus (CS) from a change in the good in question which can be represented as CS = [e(p0, q,, q0, U0)]-[e(p0, q,, ql, U0)],
or equivalently, CS = Y0 -Y•, where e is the expenditure function, P0 the vector of prices for marketed goods, q, is the vector of nonmarketed goods which remain fixed, q0 and q• are the initial and subsequent levels of the nonmarketed good being valued, respectively, Y0 and Y• are the initial and subsequent levels of disposable income associated with each of the two expenditure functions, respectively, and U0 is the initial utility level. An equivalent representation of (1) which is often more useful for estimation purpose is the income compensation function [Willig, 1976] p,(q• IP0, q,,
Yo, V(po, q,, qo, Yo, T)), where T is a vector of taste parameters and V is the indirect utility function which is
assumed here to equal the utility level U0. Often the valuation question is repeated several times for different levels of the good so that a Hicksian compensated demand curve can be traced out.
Since its initial applications in the 1960s, considerable effort has been devoted to establishing its theoretical basis, developing the actual methodology and, where possible, comparing its estimates with those using market demand based measures Mitchell and Carson, 1989 ]. Even though the method is now the one most frequently used to value environmental amenities (Carson et al. [1993] provide a bibliography of over 1200 papers on contingent valuation); its use has its critics [e.g., Cambridge Economics, 1992]. If one accepts the compensating surplus form of WTP as the appropriate welfare measure for a specified improvement in the water quality enjoyed by an individual household and takes the current distribution of income as given, then a point on the Samuelson-Bradford bid/benefit curve [Randall et al., 1974] is given by summing all household's WTP amounts for the new level of water quality. Optimal provision of water quality occurs at the point where the aggregate marginal cost and marginal benefit curves cross. Table 1 shows the types of benefits which might accrue from improved water quality. In the presence of uncertainty, contingent valuation obtains an estimate of the difference between two planned expenditure functions, an ex ante welfare measure which is referred to as option price [Smith, 1987] . Several benefit categories, particularly those making up the nonuse (i.e., existence) class of benefits, may show no traces in marketplace transactions. There are reasons to believe that this class of benefits may comprise a sizable portion of total water quality benefits [Fisher and Raucher, 1984] . Among benefit measurement techniques, the contingent valuation method is uniquely able to measure nonuse The scenario's wording emphasized the nonuniform distribution of water quality implied by the concept of "minimum" water quality. Respondents were told that although the present minimum level is boatable, most of the nation's freshwater bodies are currently fishable and perhaps 70-80% are swimmable. When asked to value the boatable (minimum) level, respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay "to keep the nation's freshwater bodies from falling below the boatable (minimum) level where they are now." This "below boatable" baseline, which was described in some detail in the scenario, represented the minimum level of national water quality which would occur if all present annual expenditures for water pollution control by industry and governmental entities ceased. The U.S. Commerce Department also measures water pollution control expenditures from this baseline. This baseline offered the respondents the opportunity to purchase water quality improvements in a form which allows the compensating surplus-WTP measure to be used in all the valuation questions.
The payment vehicle used in this study was annual taxes and higher product prices. While contingent valuation estimates are not generally independent of the payment vehicle used, the one used here has the advantages that it corresponds with the way citizens presently pay for water quality and that it was accepted by most respondents without protest as appropriate for this purpose. In an effort to avoid the starting point bias associated with the commonly used bidding game method [Boyle et at., 1985; Randall et at., 1974] , our elicitation procedure used a grounded payment card format we first developed and tested in the pilot study for this project. Respondents were divided into five income groups and given a payment card containing a large selection of amounts ranging in order from $0 to a very high dollar amount. In order to provide a meaningful context for the valuation exercise, five points on the continuum were identified as the amounts average households of that income group are currently paying in taxes and higher prices for nonenvironmental public goods such as defense, the space program, and police and fire protection. The willingness-topay questions asked respondents to state an amount on the payment card or "any amount in between" they were willing to pay for each of the three levels of national minimum water quality.
Because Given the variety of measures, to three quality levels by four separate measurements, it is at this point useful to make clear our assumptions about the nature of the amounts elicited. We assume that many or most of the respondents do not have a well formed value when asked in a CV survey to value a good which they are unaccustomed to purchasing. A major question in valuing water quality improvements is the shape of the benefit curve between the three goals of boatable, fishable, and swimmable water quality levels. If willingness to pay is completely contingent upon the attainment of each goal, the function is a step function, and intermediate or partial improvements would provide no additional benefits. To examine this possibility, we asked a "halfway" policy question of half the sample. These respondents were asked if they would still be willing to pay their corrected amount for swimmable "if the best we could do was to raise the minimum only halfway from fishable to swimmab!e." The overall improvement conveyed to the respondent in this treatment was substantially more than halfway, as respondents were told "At halfway, more water bodies would be improved over the fishable level, and some additional, but not all, water bodies would be improved to son, 1989], we explicitly asked respondents to keep in mind that no matter what amount they give for water pollution control, they will also continue to pay for the nation's other environmental programs such as air pollution and "air quality will remain at its present level or improve slightly." To test for the presence of this bias, we again used a split sample approach. At the point in the interview where respondents were told what amount they are already paying for pollution control, those in subsample A were told only the amount for water quality control whereas respondents receiving treatment B were given the amounts for both water and air pollution control. If this type of part-whole bias was present in the WTP c bids, we hypothesize that the provision of the air pollution cost information to subsample B respondents would cause that subsample to disproportionately reduce their WTP• amounts to compensate for their previous overspending of their environmental account.
A national area probability sampling plan based on the 1980 Census was used in this study. answering complex CV scenarios such as the one used in this study, this level of item response in a national sample, while high, may be acceptable, provided the estimates are adjusted to take into account the fact that the nonrespondents were not a random subset of the sample. These adjustments are discussed later in the paper. and an additional $89 to move from the fishable minimum quality to a national minimum of swimmable quality water iWTPSc) for an unadjusted mean total (WTPTOTc)of $275. An examination of the changes made by the 75 respondents who reconsidered and corrected their amounts after giving their WTP F amounts shows that most of them corrected mistakes caused by misconceptions about the elicitation process. In the WTP I iteration, 104, or 18% of the respondents corrected their bids after being informed of the approximate level of their current payments for water quality (water and air quality) improvements. Those changing bids tended to be respondents who discovered that they were actually paying more money than their previous (corrected) amount and wished to increase their WTP c amounts, Of those who discovered that they were actually paying less than they said they were willing to pay, few reduced their earlier bid. Those who changed their amounts in the last iteration (WTPv), after being confronted with the assertion that the amount they had previously committed themselves to might not be enough to maintain even the present minimum level of water quality {a strong statement), tended to be of two types: (1) respondents whose informed bid was still below their current payments and {21 respondents who already had a corrected bid much higher than their current payments. Overall, taking those who made multiple changes into account, approximately 30% of the respondents changed one or more of their WTP amounts. Of these respondents about a third changed more than once.
The mean bids for the first and corrected conditions were not significantly different based on t tests computed using a test-retest framework. Future opportunities to change generally resulted in mean bids that were insignificantly higher than their predecessors, although the WTPc series are all significantly lower than the WTP e series. We believe the WTP c series represents the most valid basis for estimating WTP (after adjustment for nonresponse). The informed series and, in particular, the highest series of WTP questions put a significant amount of pressure on the respondents to increase their willingness to pay, and should be viewed as upper bounds. The WTPe series is 30-35% larger than the WTP c series.
The results of the test to see if some respondents had believed they were valuing a broader pollution control policy which includes air pollution control are reassuring. None of the t tests of the differences in the willingness to pay for any water quality level between subsample A !•who were told what they were paying for water quality• and subsample B (who were told the amounts they are currently paying for both air and water quality improvements} has an absolute value greater than 0.75. This indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that providing information on air pollution control costs to subsample B caused that subsample to disproportionately reduce their WTP amounts. In turn, this provides support for the proposition that a particular type of policy-package part-whole bias, erroneous inclusion of air quality values, is not a major problem for this study. 
PARTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
According to the answers to the "halfway" and the "95 percent" questions, the benefits of partial improvements are considerable. For the halfway improvement question which was asked of subsample A, we find that 73% of the respondents said that going halfway from a fishable to a swimmable minimum national water quality was worth the same to them as the total improvement to the swimmable level. It is important to note that this halfway improvement would have provided a substantial amount of swimmable quality water and, as a result, is likely to be perceived as providing for a non-marginal increase in the quantity of swimmab!e quantity water. Quoting from the text read to the respondents, "At halfway [between a minirhum fishable and swimmable qual- The availability of a CV study [Smith and Desvousges, 1986 ] for a regional freshwater resource, the Monongahela River Basin in western Pennsylvania, whose design is comparable to ours in several important respects, offers an opportunity for an empirical assessment of this issue. It is possible to conduct an almost ideal test of geographic part-whole/embedding hypothesis using our data set and that of Smith and Desvousges [1986] . The ideal test would involve two large independent in-person surveys of the same population with highly trained interviewers, conducted over the same time period, using survey instruments which differed only in the specific details of the two goods being described, the two goods having well-defined relationship to each other, one inclusive of the other, and the "difference" between the two goods was such that one would expect, on economic grounds, to see a fairly large difference in the respondents' valuation of them. A comparison of our national results and Smith and Desvousges' Monongahela results meets all of these criteria except the need for two random samples of the same population at the same time: ours is a national sample theirs is a sample of the Pittsburgh area, a little less than 2 years separating the interview periods. Both of these weaknesses are easily correctable.
We can make a small CPI adjustment to Smith and Desvous- We adjusted the data from the WTPc (corrected) series to compensate for item and unit nonresponse in two steps. First, the WTP values for the 30% of the respondents with missing or invalid WTP values were imputed using CART, a powerful nonparametric tree-structured classification procedure proposed by Breiman et at. [1984] . CART searches over all values of available variables to determine the binary split (i.e., constructed dummy variable) which best predicts the variable of interest. This process is repeated using a series of nodes and branches with the data at each node being split into separate subsamples on the basis of the optimal binary predictor at that node. Cross-validation is used to "prune" the tree grown to prevent overfitting. Second, we corrected for sample nonresponse by using the household weights supplied by the Opinion Research Corporation to weight the observations to make the available sample (i.e., valid plus imputed responses) more representative of the Census population. As is typical in completed national probability sample surveys, women are somewhat overrepresented in our unweighted sample of respondents, and young black males are underrepresented. A combination of household weights and imputing the missing values reduces the adjusted WTPTOTc value by 12% with each of the two correction techniques contributing approximately equally to this reduction. This scale factor was applied for consistency to the rest of the WTPc series as shown in Table   3 .
AGGREGATE BENEFITS
In this section, we take benefit estimates from our own It is important to note that our CV scenario did not .address the possible impact of long-lived toxicants such as PCB's and heavy metals, which for the most part can no longer be legally discharged. Long-lived toxics primarily pose a problem, not because our respondents did not think that they were paying to prevent them but because if they failed to prevent them in any one year, the damages will carr•y over to other years. Our scenario poses a situation where estimates reflect benefits which may be curtailed by the cessation of expenditures or regained upon the resumption of such expenditures. Households may be willing to pay substantial amounts to control the release of such toxicants even if their willingness to pay for present water quality was zero if they had a desire for water quality in the future. Freeman [1990] notes that the earlier benefit studies also failed to account for this potentially important source of benefits.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Measuring national water quality benefits using a national contingent valuation study offers several important advantages over alternative approaches. Among other advantages, it avoids the issue of how to aggregate benefits across disparate water-related activities and how to aggregate benefits over geographic areas. Furthermore, it easily incorporates nonuse benefits. We described how our study's key features were designed to address the problems of validity and reliability which might arise in trying to make valid and reliable inferences from data obtained from a national survey of the benefits of a national good.
Evidence supporting the validity of the data include: the favorable results of an experiment to test whether the respondents were unwittingly valuing a more general package of environmental improvements, the estimation of a parsimonious valuation function which was then used to successfully predict the results of a regional CV water benefits study, and comparisons with a variety of other studies •hich showed plausible relationships. While v,e believe the results of this study as a whole are sufficientl.• valid to be used for policy analysis, those who would do so should pay careful attention to how we defined the amenity and the context in which it would be provided.
Our estimates show that the potential annual benefits of swimmable quality water in the nation's freshwater lakes, rivers, and streams are large and in excess of the latest reported (1988) annual costs of the water quality improvement program. Looking to the future, however, total costs are projected to escalate well beyond total potential benefits owing to the higher marginal costs of bringing the remaining water bodies up to swimmable quality level. In revising the Clean Water Act, Congress can improve the future benefitcost ratio by scaling back its goals, reducing the costs associated with obtaining the current goals, or both. Our work suggests that relaxing the uniform national swimmable quality goal, for example, by setting lower quality targets for certain stretches of large rivers with heavy industrial use would significantly reduce costs while resulting in only a small reduction in potential benefits. Lyon and Farrow [1993] discuss these issues in more detail. Finally, economists have long argued [e.g., Hahn, 1989] that it should be possible to reduce the cost across the board by moving from the grossly inefficient technology-based command and control approach adopted in 1972 to one of the economic incentive-based approaches. When Congress passed the Clean Water Act, almost any method of reducing projected effluent discharges would have increased the public's welfare. That is no longer true.
